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The Nicomachean Ethics, as is well known, distinguishes three types of friendship -the friendship of goodness, the friendship of pleasure, and the friendship of utility. How are these three types of friendship supposed to be related to one another? It has often been said that Aristotle regards them as focally related1, but W. W. Fortenbaugh has recently argued against this and suggested that the essential connection is provided by the notion of analogy2. It seems to me, however, that neither Fortenbaugh nor his opponents are correct. It will be the central claim of this paper that Aristotle relates the three types of friendship not by appeal either to the notion of analogical or to that of focal homonymy, but in terms of a third and little noticed form of homonymy: his view, very roughly expressed, is that all three forms of friendship do in a sense meet the definitional requirements for friendship but that whereas the friendship of goodness does so straightforwardly, the friendships of pleasure and of utility do so only in a way or only with certain qualifications. My programme is rather complex. Fortenbaugh's claim, that the three types of friendship are analogically related, is part of a wider interpretation of NE VIII and IX and cannot be considered in isolation from this. I shall therefore begin in Part I by examining Fortenbaugh's case for his interpretation. In Part II I shall sketch out an alternative interpretation, which, I believe, more accurately reflects Aristotle's view of the relationship between the various forms of friendship. And finally in Part III I shall try to clarify the view I have attributed to Aristotle by defending it against the charge that it does after all reintroduce focal homonymy into his account. (ii) that since the three types of friendship have different functions they and that is the passage at 1157 a 30-33 whose interpretation is the subject of claim (iii). Moreover, he offers only the weakest of reasons for supposing that these lines do contain such a reference: his argument is in effect that the passage should be interpreted as containing a referencc to analogy because it can be so interpreted3. Finally, claim (iv) is simply stated in passing (p. 55) as though it were an obvious truth not needing further argument -a reasonable procedure if (i) is already accepted but not otherwise. Claim (i), then, that friendships are defined by Aristotle in terms of their function, obviously lies at the heart of Fortenbaugh's interpretation, and that being so, we must look closely at the grounds on which he urges its acceptance.
Fortenbaugh opens his case for claim (i) as follows:
'It is an Aristotelian principle that the being of any functional thing consists in its capacity to perform its function (Meteor. 390 a 10-13). For any purposeful thing, whether a natural object or an organism, whether a man-devised tool or activity or association, its essential nature is determined by its function and is expressed by the logos which states its purpose . This is well-known in the case of a non-natural object like the saw .. . Friendships ... are like saws in being purposeful.'
It is difficult to be certain exactly how Fortenbaugh wishes to argue here. Part of the trouble stems from his using 'functional' and 'purposeful' as equivalent (a tendency exacerbated in the rest of the paragraph when he rings the changes on a whole galaxy of expressions ('having a use', 'having a purpose', 'goal directed', 'goal oriented', 'having a goal') as though each was straightforwardly interchangeable with 'functional'). On the face of it, his argument seems reducible to the syllogism: whatever has a function is, according to Aristotle, to be defined in terms of that function; friendships have a function, and hence, according to Aristotle, are to be defined in terms of that function. Even if we ignore the implicit equivalence between 'goal' and 'function', this passage seems to rest on a confusion. Admittedly, VIII 2 speaks of the objects of affection (ta phileta) and classifies them under the headings of the good, the pleasant and the useful. But objects of affection are simply things towards which, or persons towards whom, affection may be directed. That affection has, and is recognised by Aristotle as having, objects 'in this sense does not import the notions of goal or purpose, and only an equivocation on the word 'object' could lead one to suppose otherwise. Certainly, the word telos appears, as Fortenbaugh's evidence for claim (i) is, I conclude, unpersuasive; and since, as I have shown, the truth of this claim is fundamental to his case, its weakness must damage the acceptability of his overall interpretation of NE VIII and IX (at least so far as this is represented by claims (i)-(iv)). In particular we seem to have no good reasons for holding, with Fortenbaugh, that Aristotle saw his three types of friendship as related in terms of analogical homonymy.
II
However, I am reluctant to accept Fortenbaugh's interpretation not merely because of the fragility of his arguments, but because there seems to be a more natural and straightforward way of understanding Aristotle's account of friendship, and, as part of this, a more attractive way of construing his view of the relationship between the three types of friendship.
The cardinal points of this alternative interpretation, for which I shall argue in this part of the paper, are: (i) that Aristotle regards the three conditions enumerated in VIII 2 -namely, reciprocal affection between the parties, reciprocal goodwill, and a mutual awareness of such affection and goodwill -as sufficient and not just necessary conditions of friendship; (ii) that he doubts whether the friendships of utility and pleasure are friendships precisely because he is uncertain whether they do fulfil these conditions; (iii) that his remarks about the 'simple' resemblances and dissimilarities between the three friendships (in 1 157 a 1-3, 1158 b 1-1 1, etc.) arise out of this concern as to whether all three types do satisfy the definitional requirements of VIII 2; and (iv) that the thought underlying 1157 a 30-33 (where Fortenbaugh discerns a reference to analogical homonymy) is that the inferior friendships (of pleasure and of utility) may count as friendships because they meet the conditions of VIII 2, but are not strictly or properly friendships because they meet these conditions only in a way, or only with certain qualifications.
Of these claims, it will be observed, the first conflicts directly with Fortenbaugh's (iv) (see p. 18 1), and hence with his (i) and (ii) as well, while the fourth is a contrary of Fortenbaugh's (iii). It is, of course, the truth of (iv), with its implications for Aristotle's view of the relationship between the three types of friendship, that I am particularly anxious to establish.
Let us begin, though, with claim (i), which concerns the status of the conditions for friendship laid down in VIII 2. Now VIII 2 is of course the only chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics to deal in general terms with the definitional question 'What is friendship?', and this fact seems in itself some reason for assuming that the three conditions enumerated therereciprocal affection, wishing well to the other party for his own sake, and an awareness that the first two conditions are fulfilled -are offered as necessary and sufficient conditions of friendship. This assumption is reinforced when we examine in more detail the way these conditions are presented. At 1155 b 27 Aristotle says in effect that affection by itself is not sufficient for friendship: the affection we feel for lifeless objects is not friendship because it is not returned and because we do not wish such objects well (I 155 b 28-29). His next move is to combat the assumption that reciprocal affection and goodwill jointly constitute sufficient conditions (1155 b 33-34): there must be, as well, an awareness by the parties that the preceding conditions are fulfilled (1155 b 34). Such being the structure of the passage it seems perverse not to take its conclusion at 1156 a 3-5 as a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions. Surely if there is no evidence to the contrary elsewhere, we may be confident that this reading of the chapter is correct. Not only is no such evidence to be found; rather, I believe, the subsequent course of Book VIII positively favours the oposed interpretation.
That Aristotle cannot intend the conditions of VIII 2 as sufficient may be stered by the impression that he elsewhere insists on the necessity of certain other conditions. What, in particular, of his claim that friendship requires some activity by the parties, mere feeling is not enough (1 167 Nor does he see the former requirement as introducing a condition over and above those of VIII 2, but as being already included with the latter: unless there is an obstacle, the satisfaction of the conditions of VIII 2 will naturally lead to, or involve, some activity (1157b7-11, 1166b32-34).
Our next move, then, must be to review the subsequent course of the discussion in Book VIII and consider whether it bears out the claim that the conditions of VIII 2 are intended as necessary and sufficient for friendship. This review, it will be seen, further contributes to the strategy of this part of the paper by giving me the opportunity to argue for the truth of my claims (B) On my reading of 1157 a 30-32 we can give good sense to the immediately following remarks in a 32-33 ('for in that respect in which there is something good and something similar, they are friends; for in fact the pleasant is good to the lovers of pleasure'). The substance of 1157 a 30-32, on my interpretation, is that while the inferior friendships may count as friendships because they do meet the definitional criteria of VIII 2, they are not friendships proper because they meet these criteria only in a certain way or only with certain qualifications, whereas the friendship of good men satisfies the requirements without qualification and hence is primarily or properly friendship. And this view Aristotle would elaborate, if I am right, by appealing to the fact that in the friendship of goodness the parties feel affection for each other, and hence are friends, without qualification, whereas in friendships of utility and pleasure the parties feel affection for each other, and hence are friends, only insofar as they are mutually useful and pleasant respectively. Now the remark at 1157 a 32 ('in that respect in which there is something good and something similar they are friends') seems a commendably brief way of making precisely this last point. In case, however, we should have failed to grasp it, the next sentence (in a 33) adds an explanatory note: those whose affection is based on the fact that they are mutually pleasant will possess some goodness -because, after all, 'the pleasant is good to lovers of pleasure'.
(C) At this stage it will be as well to dispose of an objection that may seem the more powerful because of my insistence that we should understand 1157 a 30-32 against the background of the preceding discussion in VIII 3-4. That discussion, it will be said, underlines several points of similarity between the three kinds of friendship: Aristotle says that the friendship of pleasure resembles the friendship of goodness in that the parties to it find each other mutually pleasant, while the friendship of utility resembles the friendship of goodness in respect of the mutual usefulness of the parties (I 156 b 35-1 157 a 3) . But that being so, when it is stated at 1 157 a 30-32 that the three forms of friendship are related by similarity (kath' homoiote'ta), why not suppose that Aristotle is referring directly to these points of similarity? Is not this a more natural way of understanding the passage than that which I have suggested?
Such is the objection. A good deal can be said in reply, but the essence of my rebuttal is that the allegedly more natural interpretation of 1 157 a 30-32 does not allow Aristotle to explain in even a remotely satisfactory way why we should follow ordinary usage and call friendships of utility and friendships of pleasure friendships. In the first place, it seems intuitively implausible to justify acceptance of ordinary usage by a bare appeal to the fact that the friendship of pleasure resembles the best form of friendship in respect of pleasantness while the friendship of utility does so in respect of usefulness. These points of resemblance seem too slight and superficial to do the work that is required of them. Moreover, there are, so far as I know, no parallel cases and certainly none in the NE, where hesitation over whether a single term properly applies to a range of items is resolved by Aristotle in a similar manner. More seriously, once the context is fully taken into account we can see that the answer attributed to Aristotle by the allegedly more natural interpretation involves a blatant ignoratio elenchi. The doubts which 1 157 a 30-32 are intended to settle have arisen during a discussion in which the friendships of utility and of pleasure were said to possess some of the characteristics of the best form of friendship and to lack others. But if Aristotle's uncertainty whether friendships of pleasure and of utility are to count as friendships has its source in the fact that there are both points of similarity and points of difference between these types of friendship and the best type, he cannot remove that uncertainty merely by referring to the points of similarity; that is simply to rehearse some of the considerations which generated his problem, and to ignore the others. To solve the problem he needs, of course, to go beyond these considerationswhich is precisely what he does on my interpretation of 1157 a 30-32. (My point here is underlined by a later passage which mentions these same similarities and differences between the several types of friendship (VIII 6, 1 158 b 5-1 1): 'It is', says Aristotle, 'from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they (the inferior friendships) are thought (dokousi) both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship of goodness that they seem (phainontai) to be friendships . . ., while it is because the friendship of goodness is permanent while these quickly change (besides differing from the former in many other respects) that they seem (phainontai) not to be friendships'. These lines (more particularly, their use of dokousi and phainontai) make it clear that the similarities and differences discussed in VIII 3-4 as well as VIII 6 generate the problem. Hence Aristotle's answer at 1157 a 30-32, if it is to be a genuine answer, must take us beyond or behind these similarities and differences.) It seems, then, that the objection we have considered is unpersuasive.
(D) So far in trying to understand Aristotle's description of the inferior friendships as friendships kath' homoioteta, I have said nothing about the phrase kath 'homoioteta in its own right. This I must now remedy.
The idea that different types of like-named items are related kath'
homoioteta is no stranger to NE -excluding 1157 a 31-32, it occurs at least seven times in no fewer than four separate discussions.7 Of course, it would be foolish to imagine that the phrase kath'homoiote'ta should be glossed in exactly the same way on each of these occurrences -I do not suggest this, nor is it necessary for my argument that it should be so. However, on the one occasion when Aristotle explains at some length what lies behind his description of two types of like-named items as related kath'homoioteta, he plainly has in mind a similar thought to that which I have ascribed to him Of course, the phrase kata prosthesin is not intended as synonymous with the kath' homoioteta of some dozen lines earlier; it refers to our adding a clarificatory qualification when we use the word akrates to describe those who are weakwilled not in relation to bodily pleasures but in relation to honour, anger, and the like. All the same, the occurrence of the phrase seems to bear out our view that Aristotle regards cases of akrasia kath' homoioteta as satisfying the definition of akrasia proper but with a qualification.
Obviously, as I have already said, what lies behind the talk of akrasia kath'homoiote'ta at 1147 b 31 cannot be invoked automatically to elucidate the phrase kath' homoioteta wherever else it may occur in NE.8 On the other hand, and to return to philia, there are numerous points of similarity between Aristotle's treatment of friendship in NE and his treatment of weakness of will which make it entirely reasonable that we should take 1 147 b 31 as shedding light on, and confirming our interpretation of, 1157 a 30-32. These points of similarity between the two discussions have been little noticed and deserve attention in their own right. I can do no more here than merely list a few of them. Most obviously, perhaps, the claim that there are several eide of philia parallels a similar acknowledgement in the case of akrasia at 1149 a 23. Again, as we have seen, Aristotle remarks that we describe some cases of weakness of will as akrasia kata prosthesin, as akrasia with a clarifying qualification. The phrase kataprosthesin, it is true, does not appear in the discussion of philia, but it well might have done: 
III
I should like to devote the remainder of this paper to bringing my interpretation, and more particularly claim (iv), into sharper focus. And I propose to do this by considering, and rebutting, the charge that the interpretation does, after all, relate the three kinds of friendship in terms of focal homonymy.9
How such a charge might be brought is not difficult to understand. I have argued that, according to Aristotle, the inferior forms of friendship satisfy the definitional requirements of VIII 2, but with a qualification, whereas the friendship of good men meets these requirements without any qualification: in the inferior forms of friendship the parties wish each other well and feel affection for each other in a certain respect or with certain restrictions, whereas in the best form good will and affection are unqualified. But is not this, it may be asked, simply to treat friendship as a case of focal homonymy? According to the usual explanations, X1, X2 and X3 are focally related when the definition of X1 reappears as part of the definitions of X2 and X3; (thus a healthy body, a healthy complexion and a healthy diet are focally related because, supposing a healthy body to be a Q body, a healthy complexion will be a complexion indicative of a 4 body, and a healthy diet a diet productive of a p body). But then surely, as I have presented Aristotle's account, will not the definition of the best form of friendship reappear in precisely this way as an element in the definitions of each of the inferior forms?
The short reply to this objection is to repeat a point made by G. E. L. Owen:10 'When Aristotle comes to specify the criteria of focal meaning he is at once too narrowly scholastic and too hospitable. He calls for precise definitions which exhibit a particular formal connexion -XoyoL ?x 'rCv Xoycv, one definition contained in the rest; yet his criterion would admit the Academic example that elsewhere he seems to reject ... Aristotle has not solved the problem of defining focal meaning fully and exactly. . .; he has given only the necessary, not the sufficient conditions . . .'. We can, in other words, deal with the objection by pointing out that it erroneously takes as a sufficient condition of focal homonymy what is merely a necessary condition. The fact that the several forms of friendship satisfy this necessary condition does not establish them to be focally related.
However, this brief answer, adequate as it may be, can be supplemented in a more positive spirit. The obvious way of bringing out that the objection is ill-founded is to make more explicit some of the differences between focal homonymy and the homonymy that I have claimed to find in the case of friendship (homonymy kath'homoioteta, let us call it.) In this connection there are, I think, two main points to be made.
First, even if we concede that both focal homonymy and homonymy kath ' homoiote'ta involve the idea that the definition of one item in a set of like-named items reappears as an element in the definitions of the derivative or related items, we should distinguish the way in which the 'derivative' definitions are formed in the case of friendship and the way in which they are formed in a paradigm case of focal homonymy. With a focally related set of items (for example, healthy body, healthy complexion, healthy diet, and the like) we generate the definitions of the derivative items by operating on the definition of the 'nuclear' item with a phrase such as 'productive of, 'indicative of, 'useful to', 'preservative of; the definition is thereby, as it were, transformed. By contrast, in the case of friendship we form the definitions of the 'derivative' items by qualifying the definition of the 'primary' or 'nuclear' item; such a phrase as 'insofar as they are mutually useful' functions as a qualifying addition to the definition of the 'primary' item. We cannot pretend that its role in relation to the definition of philia proper is at all akin to that of 'productive of or 'indicative of in a paradigm case of focal homonymy.'1 However, in making this point we are in danger of conceding too much to the objector and neglecting a more basic consideration. This is that in characterising as he does the relationship between the various forms of friendship our objector distorts the essential nature of that relationship as it is presented in NE VIII. Even if the three types of friendship do possess a necessary characteristic of focal homonymy (in that the definition of the best type reappears as an element in the definitions of the other types), they possess it only incidentally. We can appreciate this by recalling the outlines of Aristotle's account. As I understand that account, VIII 2 sets out the conditions for friendship tout court, conditions which the friendship of goodness is then said to meet without qualification, unlike the lesser friendships which meet them only with a qualification. It is merely as a consequence of this that the definition of the friendship of goodness might be said to enter as an element into the definitions of the lesser types of friendship, i.e., because the friendship of goodness straightforwardly meets the conditions for. friendship tout court while the other types do so only with qualifications. Thus the best form of friendship is primary, not because its definition enters as an element into the definitions of the other forms of friendship but because it most completely satisfies the definitional requirements of friendship tout court. (As is well known, nothing similar to this can be said in a genuine case of focal homonymy: the healthiness of a healthy body is not primary because it most completely satisfies the definitional requirements for healthiness tout court; there is no such thing as healthiness tout court.)
We must insist, then, that Aristotle's account of friendship cannot involve focal hdmonymy, because he is prepared to offer a definition of friendship tout court which the various forms of friendship satisfy in different ways. But in insisting on this we must guard against distorting his account in the opposite direction, and thinking that the various forms of friendship are related to friendship tout court as species to genus. (Clearly, if that were so, we should immediately be attacked by a swarm of puzzles:
for, on the one hand, how can the friendship of goodness be a species if its definition is identical with the definition of the genus? and, on the other, how, if the friendships of pleasure and of utility are species of friendship, can we refuse to regard the friendship of goodness as a third co-ordinate species?) The truth is that although the inferior forms of friendship do with certain qualifications satisfy the conditions for friendship tout court, the addition of these qualifications casts doubt on whether they genuinely satisfy the conditions. In other words, it is not the case that the three forms of friendship all in their different ways straightforwardly meet the conditions for friendship tout court -that would relate them as co-ordinate species of a single genus. Rather, the ways in which the friendships of pleasure and of utility meet these conditions tempt us to believe that, after all, they do not really meet them.
This paradox obviously deserves further exploration, but to provide that would unfortunately take me well beyond the concerns of the present paper. It will be sufficient if I have shown that previous interpretations of NE VIII, which find there either focal or analogical homonymy, not only misconstrue Aristotle's account of the relation between the three types of friendship but blind us to the presence in that account of a largely neglected, though no less intriguing form of homonymy.
